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 Self-Categorization as a Social Process in Small Groups 
Margaret J. Peterson, M.S. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2007 
 
Categorical context, including relevant comparison dimensions, a group’s position on 
those dimensions, and the selection of an outgroup with which to compare one’s own group, is 
important for the categorization process as described by self-categorization and social identity 
theories.  However, despite evidence that talk is important in the formation of a group identity 
and the theoretical importance of sharing a categorical context, little work has been done 
regarding how groups come to develop and share knowledge of this context.    The verbal 
interactions of 46 three-person groups were recorded and analyzed to test hypothesized positive 
correlations among group members’ talk about categorical context, their subsequent agreement 
about the group’s prototype, identification with the group, and displays of ingroup biases.  The 
lack of support for the hypothesized relationships and the possible implications of these results 
for self-categorization and social identity theory are also discussed. 
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Self-Categorization as a Social Process in Small Groups 
 Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982) and self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, 
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) have been very influential in social psychology (see Hogg, 
2001; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996; & Terry, Hogg, & White, 2000).  Both theories propose that an 
individual’s self-concept depends in part on the groups to which he or she belongs (e.g. Hogg & 
Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1982; Turner et al., 1987).   These groups can range from small, face-to-
face interactive groups, such as sports teams or work groups, to larger social categories, such as 
gender or nationality.  Most research on social identity, however, has focused on the latter kinds 
of groups; social identity and self-categorization in small groups have been largely neglected.  
Hogg (1996, 2001) argues that this neglect has been detrimental both to theorizing about social 
identity and to research on groups.   
 Most research on social identity has also focused on situations in which the ingroup and 
outgroups are very clear to participants (see Reicher & Hopkins, 1996).  Knowledge of the social 
context, including relevant comparison dimensions, the ingroup’s position on those dimensions, 
and the selection of an outgroup with which to compare the ingroup on those dimensions, is vital 
to the categorization process, but the issue of how such knowledge is acquired has been ignored.  
Group boundaries are often discussed as though they are obvious, so that categorization becomes 
a simple, almost automatic process that people can carry out on their own.  This view of 
categorization, as an individual cognitive process, ignores the fact that categorization is often an 
interactive social process.  In fact, social identity and categorization can be seen as forms of 
socially shared cognition that require interaction (see Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & 
Reynolds, 1998; Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; Larson & Christensen, 1993; Resnick, 
1 
Levine, & Teasley, 1991; Thompson & Fine, 1999). Without collaboration, categorization could 
be very difficult.  
I will first provide a brief overview of social identity theory and self-categorization 
theory, then review research suggesting that self-categorization often involves social interaction, 
and finally discuss an experiment that examined the processes by which small groups form 
prototypes and the relationship between such prototypes and group behavior.   
Self-Categorization 
Self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) is an outgrowth of Tajfel and Turner’s 
(1979) theory of social identity.  Social identity theory identifies three processes through which 
group membership can play a role in the self-concept.  The first process is categorization.  
Categorizing objects and people allows people to make sense of the world and plan effective 
action (e.g. Bruner, 1957, Doise, 1978, Hogg, 2001).  For example, categorizing people clarifies 
the boundaries between groups and thus guides social behavior.  The second process is social 
identity.  Social categorization orients an individual and defines his or her place in the social 
world.  The piece of someone’s self-concept that is derived from the knowledge of his or her 
membership in a social category combined with the emotional significance of that membership 
becomes that person’s social identity (Tajfel, 1978).  The third process is social comparison.  
Social identity theory assumes that people need to view themselves positively in relation to 
others, so they use social comparison to determine whether their group is better or worse than 
other groups.  If it is not, their social identity can be improved in any of several ways, including 
social mobility (i.e. moving to another, better group), social competition (e.g. trying to become 
better than another group), and social creativity (e.g. finding new outgroups for social 
comparison that are worse than the person’s own group). 
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Self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) also emphasizes the importance of social 
identity, but goes on to elaborate the categorization process.  Categorization is based on the 
accessibility of a given category and the ‘fit’ between that category and reality (do the known 
properties of that category match social or sensory input?).  Categorization also involves the 
principle of meta-contrast -- the maximization of similarities within categories and differences 
between categories.  For example, if a person is categorizing at the individual level, then he or 
she will focus on those qualities that distinguish one individual from another, but if 
categorization is at the group level, then the most salient qualities will be those that distinguish 
one group from another.   
When categorization occurs at the group level, it leads to the formation of a prototype 
that embodies the “typical” group member.  The qualities that comprise this prototype maximize 
similarities within the ingroup and the outgroup, as well as differences between the ingroup and 
the outgroup (Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987).  Categorization thus leads to a perceptual 
homogenization of both ingroups and outgroups, centered around their respective prototypes 
(e.g. Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978).  So, when people categorize at the group level, 
they see the world not as a collection of unique individuals, but as sets of people who match 
relevant group prototypes to varying degrees (see Hogg, 2001).  This creates a kind of 
“depersonalization,” in which members become interchangeable exemplars of their groups. 
Group prototypes and depersonalization are the basis for all group behavior, including intergroup 
biases, according to self-categorization theorists.   
All of this is not restricted, however, to the perception of others.  Just as people 
categorize and depersonalize others based on their group memberships, they also categorize and 
depersonalize themselves (Turner et al., 1987; Turner & Oakes, 1989).  As a result, people see in 
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themselves the qualities that they share with other ingroup members and that distinguish them 
from outgroup members (see Hogg, 2001).  A person’s self-concept may thus reflect the 
prototypes of whatever groups are salient to him or her at a given time.       
 As Hogg reminds us, “Groups exist by virtue of there being outgroups.” (2001, p.56).  
Essential to the principle of meta-contrast is the existence of one or more outgroups with which 
to contrast the ingroup.  Although some new research suggests that intragroup processes alone 
may be enough for group formation and ingroup bias (Gaertner, Iuzzini, Witt, & Guerrero, 
2006), most of the research in this area supports the idea that outgroups are very important to 
group processes and behaviors.  For example, Voci (2006) found that depersonalization and 
ingroup bias only occurred when the existence of an outgroup was made salient to group 
members (high accessibility).  Although participants were explicitly asked to consider intragroup 
issues (i.e. to indicate prototypical behaviors of members of their own organization), group 
identification and behaviors were not triggered without mention of an outgroup.   
Other research has shown that the group prototype depends on whatever outgroup(s) 
people compare their own group to in a specific context (e.g. Doosje, Haslam, Spears, Oakes, & 
Koomen, 1998).  Changes in the categorical context necessarily change a group’s prototype, and 
thus alter the self-concepts of group members.  As noted earlier, the categorical context includes 
the choice of relevant comparison dimensions, the position of the ingroup on these dimensions, 
and the selection of an outgroup with which to compare (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996).  
Interdependence between the categorical context and the group prototype is an important aspect 
of self-categorization.  Yet in most self-categorization research, an experimenter stipulates the 
categorical context for participants and then studies its effects on their self-concepts and 
intergroup behavior (see Reicher & Hopkins, 1996).   
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 For example, a common method for studying social identity and ingroup/outgroup biases 
is the minimal group paradigm (e.g. Brewer, 1979; Makimura & Yamagishi, 2003; Nesdale & 
Flesser, 1991: Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; also see Rabbie & Schot, 
1990; Tajfel, 1982 for reviews).  In this paradigm, participants are assigned to “groups” using 
novel and meaningless criteria (e.g. whether they prefer the abstract painter Klee or Kandinsky, 
or what color poker chip they draw).  These groups have no history of prior interactions, nor is 
any interaction allowed within or between groups during the experiment.  Once the groups have 
been created, participants are asked to distribute rewards or punishments to one another (but not 
to themselves) based solely on their knowledge of group memberships.  The fact that ingroup 
bias is seen even in these “minimal” groups reveals the strength of that bias. 
Although this paradigm is valuable, it masks the natural categorization processes that 
occur in more realistic settings.  The paradigm reveals nothing about the relationship between a 
group’s choice of a categorical context and the resulting group prototype and behavior.  The 
entire categorical context, including the choice of relevant comparative dimensions, the group’s 
position on those dimensions, and the choice of outgroups, is stipulated for participants.   
A few researchers have gone beyond Tajfel et al.’s (1971) classic minimal groups 
research by using a similar paradigm to examine the effects of intragroup interaction on ingroup 
bias (e.g. Gaertner & Schopler, 1998; Petersen, Dietz, & Frey, 2004).  For example, Petersen and 
his colleagues randomly assigned participants to three-person groups, supposedly based on their 
Klee or Kandinsky preferences.  These groups then assigned rewards to other groups (not in their 
immediate three-person group) deciding either collectively (as an interacting group) or 
individually.  The only information they had about these other groups was whether they 
preferred Klee or Kandinsky.   The researchers found that interaction among group members 
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increased bias towards the superordinate ingroup.  They attributed this to the fact that interaction 
and discussion increases the salience of category boundaries between ingroup and outgroup 
members and thereby enhances categorization processes.  Though their paradigm encourages 
discussion and interaction, these researchers still did not analyze this interaction or examine how 
the categorical context formed.  
Even in field research on natural groups, many aspects of the categorical context are 
often stipulated.  When Hogg, Cooper-Shaw, & Holzworth (1993) measured group prototypes in 
work units, for example, they asked participants to think about the qualities that set their own 
work group apart from other work groups, thus indicating to participants what the relevant 
outgroups were.  Although Hogg and his colleagues did not specify the comparative dimensions 
or ingroup positions on these dimensions, stipulating the relevant outgroups probably influenced 
the prototypes that participants developed.  This experiment also failed to examine the process 
by which those prototypes were refined and shared.  Other social identity and self-categorization 
researchers have also stipulated parts of the categorical context for participants (e.g. Lord, 
Lepper, & Mackie, 1984; Rijswijk & Ellemers, 2002; Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 
2003).  In fact, all three components of that context are often stipulated (e.g. Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-
Cardamone, & Crook, 1989; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997; Marques & Paez, 1994). 
Researchers have traditionally ignored the processes by which groups choose and share a 
categorical context, even when they are explicitly interested in the role of comparative contexts 
in ingroup prototypes.  For example, Doosje et al. (1998) specified one of two outgroups 
(physics or drama students) and a comparative dimension (scientific or artistic) for psychology 
students and measured how this affected their descriptions of the ingroup.  In line with social 
identity and self-categorization theories, they found that changing either the relevant outgroup or 
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the relevant comparative dimension changed how people described their ingroup.  This study is 
important because it demonstrates that large changes in a group prototype can occur depending 
on the categorical context, but it does not help us understand how a group chooses or 
communicates the context so that members can agree about a prototype.    
Other researchers have also studied the effects of context on descriptions of the ingroup.  
Haslam, Oakes, Turner, and McGarty (1995) and Hopkins and Murdoch (1998) both used a 
“one-group/ two-group” paradigm to examine differences in group descriptions based on 
whether or not an outgroup was stipulated.  In the Haslam et al. experiment, Australian 
participants were asked to describe either Australians (the ingroup) or Americans (the outgroup).  
In the ‘one-group’ condition, only one group was mentioned.  In the ‘two-group’ condition, 
participants were explicitly asked to describe one group in comparison to the other.  Hopkins and 
Murdoch (1998) used a similar procedure, stipulating the British as the ingroup and Americans 
as the outgroup.  In both experiments, descriptions of the outgroup were similar in the ‘one-
group’ and ‘two-group’ conditions.  However, descriptions of the ingroup changed dramatically 
from one condition to the other, underscoring the importance of the context.  Hopkins and 
Murdoch also found that there was significantly greater agreement among participants’ 
descriptions of the ingroup in the ‘two-group’ condition than in the ‘one-group’ condition.  This 
suggests that greater agreement among group members regarding the categorical context leads to 
greater agreement about the group’s prototype.    
Such research begs several questions.  How is the categorical context determined when it 
is not stipulated?  How do group members develop a shared prototype?  How much do they 
agree about their outgroup(s)?  In experimental groups, the context can be specified, but what 
processes are taking place in real groups? 
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Self-Categorization as a Social Process 
 A few researchers have at least acknowledged the role and effects of social interaction in 
categorization and its effects.  One important assumption of self-categorization theory is that 
shared membership in a social category is what influences our thoughts, feelings, and behavior 
(Turner, 1987; see also Turner & Oakes, 1989).  When people perceive that they share 
membership in a group, they also expect to agree with each other on issues relevant to that 
group.  Haslam et al. (1998) argued that this expectation should motivate people to actively seek 
such agreement.  Relevant efforts include specifying frames of reference, identifying shared 
beliefs, and exchanging information about interpersonal similarities and differences.  As Haslam, 
Turner, Oakes, Reynolds, and Doosje (2002) noted, stereotypes (even stereotypes of an ingroup) 
are collective achievements.  
If group members are indeed motivated to agree about identity-related issues, then 
seeking such agreement should be one of the first activities to occur in a newly-formed group.  
Some models of group development indeed claim that establishing a group identity is the first 
task that group members tackle.  For example, Worchel’s (1998) dynamic model of group 
development includes (in order) stages of group identity, group productivity, individuation, and 
decay.  The identity stage involves defining group boundaries, locating the group in relation to 
other groups, and understanding relationships among group members.  Norms are established, 
group boundaries are set, and relations with outgroups may become strained.  The goal is to 
strengthen group members’ social identity and weaken their personal identities (cf. Kanter, 
1968). 
In one study exploring this model, Worchel and his colleagues (Worchel, Coutant-Sassic, 
& Wong, 1993; see also Worchel, 1998) examined the conversations of small laboratory groups 
8 
that met together over several sessions to work on various creative tasks.  They found that group 
members indeed spent the early portion of their time together getting acquainted, exploring 
similarities in backgrounds and interests, establishing norms and roles, discussing how their 
group was unique, and agreeing to perform better than other groups in the study.  This 
discussion, or talk, was important in establishing and sharing identity.  However, Worchel did 
not study group prototypes or how they emerged, nor did he examine the relationship between 
identity talk and later measures of group behavior.   
Talk about identity issues may be one of the most important social processes in groups.  
Several researchers have studied talk among the members of natural groups about their social 
identity.  For example, Lyon (1974), a sociologist, described life in a small, avant-garde theater 
company.  Company members often discussed what made them different from other theater 
groups, what constituted ‘true membership’ in the group, and what types of plays their group 
should perform to reflect its identity.  This kind of talk helped to clarify the group prototype for 
incoming members, and justified to current members the sacrifices (e.g., little or no pay) they 
had to make because of limited resources.   
Other work in sociology also provides evidence for the importance of communication in 
establishing group identity.  For example, Hunt and Benford (1994) conducted qualitative, 
ethnographic studies of talk among political activists.  Their goal was to illustrate how personal 
and collective identities were formed and reinforced through ‘identity talk’ in the stories told by 
group members.  Six types of stories were told, namely 1) associational declarations, 2) 
disillusionment anecdotes, 3) atrocity tales, 4) ‘personal is political’ reports, 5) guide narratives, 
and 6) war stories.  Although Hunt and Benford did not analyze these stories in terms of ingroups 
and outgroups, self-categorization, or prototypes, many of their examples of identity talk seemed 
9 
to involve categorical contexts.   Associational declarations, for example, often contained 
references to what a group was not (usually in reference to a specific outgroup), as well as what 
it was.  Relevant dimensions of comparison and ingroup positions on those dimensions were also 
discussed.  The other types of stories contained categorical elements as well.  For example, 
atrocity tales involved villains and victims, who were described in ways that led the audience to 
identify with the victims (the ingroup) and reject the villains (the outgroup).     
Within social psychology, talk and language have also been viewed as factors in social 
identity.  For example, Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, and Semin (1989) showed that people use more 
abstract language to talk about favorable ingroup and unfavorable outgroup behaviors, and more 
concrete language to talk about unfavorable ingroup and favorable outgroup behaviors.  This 
pattern of speech is called the linguistic intergroup bias.  And in communications, discourse 
analysis (see Potter & Wetherell, 1987) has also been used to reveal how language can produce 
positive self-images through blame and mitigation and how individuals talk about themselves in 
relation to others (see Reicher & Hopkins, 1996).  Condor (2006) used discourse analysis to 
explore the use of prejudiced talk about outgroups as a socially shared (rather than an individual 
cognitive) process.  Until recently, however, there have been few discourse analyses of 
categorical processes.  Even less attention has been paid to the role of discourse in self-
categorization.   
  One exception is some work by Reicher and Hopkins (1996), who studied a speech given 
to a group of medical students by an anti-abortion advocate.  Because the categorical context is 
so important, they hypothesized that the speaker would pay particular attention to a) defining the 
ingroup to include himself, b) defining ingroup boundaries broadly enough to include most or all 
of the audience, and c) defining the proposed actions as prototypical of the group.  Reicher and 
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Hopkins then analyzed the speech for material that seemed to (re)define category boundaries.  
The speaker accomplished this by categorizing the medical profession (the audience) and himself 
as a single group of caring, principled, professionals (the ingroup), in contrast to selfish, 
unprincipled mercenaries (the outgroup).  Interestingly, this grouping contradicts the traditional 
cultural categorization (in Britain) of doctors who provide abortions as people concerned with 
the well-being of women, and of anti-abortionists as dogmatic religious fanatics.   
 Although this study was intriguing, it did not reveal whether the speaker achieved his 
apparent goals, or whether the doctors in his audience indeed adopted the categorization context 
suggested by the speaker.  As Condor (2006) points out, many social psychologists treat rhetoric 
and dialogue as nearly synonymous, even though they can function in very different ways.  
Rhetorical attempts at category transformation may be resisted.  All of the members of a group 
must agree on a categorical context for a shared group prototype to exist.  Using rhetoric to alter 
the comparative context may or may not accomplish that goal. 
My Research 
  At the heart of self-categorization theory is the idea of a shared group prototype, which 
depends on a particular categorical context.  Talk among group members about identity can 
shape that context, but this process has seldom been studied.  My special contribution to this area 
will be to examine the social processes involved in determining the categorical context for 
groups and the subsequent formation of group prototypes.  An experiment to test several 
hypotheses suggested by self-categorization theory and research on talk and identity was thus 
performed. 
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 Because a categorical context is so important in determining group identity, and because 
a shared identity is what makes group behavior possible, establishing a categorical context 
should be a high priority for every group.  Thus, my first hypothesis was that: 
1) Without intervention from an experimenter, group members will develop their own 
categorical context that includes dimensions of comparison, the group’s positions on 
those dimensions, and a comparative outgroup or outgroups. 
 In natural groups, interaction (especially talk) contributes to social identification through 
the development of a categorical context (e.g. Hunt & Benford 1994; Maass, et al., 1989; Reicher 
& Hopkins,1996).   In task-focused, zero-history laboratory groups, however, talk may be 
constrained to task issues (Scheerhorn, Geist, & Teboul, 1994).  Groups that have time to talk 
without being distracted by a task may thus be even more likely to consider and discuss their 
own categorical context.  This led to my second hypothesis: 
2) Groups that are given time to talk before working on a task will discuss their 
categorical context more extensively than groups that must immediately start work on 
the task  
 As outlined in self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), a group’s prototype arises 
through social comparison processes, guided by the principle of meta-contrast.  This suggests 
that greater agreement among group members about the categorical context will lead to greater 
agreement about the group’s prototype.  Groups whose members talk more about the categorical 
context should thus display greater agreement about their prototypes. 
3) More discussion of the categorical context will be associated with greater 
agreement among group members about their prototype. 
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A final hypothesis is based on research showing that people who identify more stongly 
with their groups display greater ingroup/outgroup biases (e.g. Hinkle et al., 1989; Tajfel et al., 
1971).  Strong identification requires a clear prototype.  This suggests that groups with greater 
prototype agreement will be more biased. 
4)  Greater agreement about a group prototype will be positively correlated with 
ingroup/outgroup biases. 
Methods 
Participants 
 Participants were 144 (82 male, 62 female) students from Introduction to Psychology 
classes at the University of Pittsburgh.  In exchange for their participation, these students 
received credit towards a course research experience requirement.  Participants were tested in 48 
groups, each composed of three unacquainted persons.  The first eleven groups were run as a 
pilot study.  Because there were no meaningful changes to the procedure and no significant 
differences between these groups and the additional groups, all of the data were combined for the 
final analyses.  One group’s data were lost due to an equipment malfunction and another group’s 
data were excluded due to their failure to follow instructions.  The final sample thus contained 46 
groups.  Participants were randomly assigned to groups and groups were randomly assigned to 
conditions.   
Materials and Equipment 
 The groups designed posters using Microsoft PowerPoint™ software on a Dell desktop 
computer with a 15” flat-screen monitor.  Digital video recordings of group interaction were 
made (with all participants’ permission) using a LogiTech QuickCam cordless webcam mounted 
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on the wall near the computer.  Each recording was later edited into segments (free talk and 
working on the posters) using Microsoft MovieMaker™ software.   
Procedure 
 As the three members of each group arrived at the laboratory’s waiting room, they were 
seated and asked not to interact with anyone there.  Once everyone arrived, they were taken to a 
laboratory room and told that the purpose of the experiment was to study group processes.  Each 
group was told that it would use a computer to design a poster promoting responsible drinking 
behaviors.  Participants were informed that a “tips” sheet for performing common operations in 
PowerPoint™ would be provided when the group actually began to work on its poster, that an 
independent panel of judges would evaluate the poster, and that members of the groups with the 
two best posters would receive a cash prize of $10.00 per person. 
Each group was then assigned to one of two conditions.  In the Task-plus condition, 
group members were given 20 minutes to talk before the task began.  They were told to discuss 
anything that they liked, but not to begin working on the task until the 20 minutes ended.  In the 
Task-only (control) condition, group members began the task immediately.   This manipulation 
was designed to test Hypothesis 2, that groups given time to talk without distraction would 
discuss the categorical context more than groups that were not given such time.  All groups had 
40 minutes to complete their posters.  All group interaction, including the 20-minute free-talk 
segments, was recorded. 
 After completing its poster, each group was given up to 10 minutes to choose 10 qualities 
that best described its prototype.  Specifically, each group was asked to choose the words that 
‘best capture your group’s core identity or best describe what it means to be a member of this 
group.”  These qualities were chosen from a list of the 200 trait adjectives (see Appendix A) 
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rated as most meaningful by Anderson’s (1968) college sample.  Each word was also rated by 
Anderson’s sample on a positivity scale that ranged from 0 (extremely unfavorable) to 6 
(extremely favorable).  The average positivity rating for all 200 of the words shown to 
participants was 2.89 and the list included both favorable and unfavorable words.  The amount of 
time the group took to complete this task was used to measure the clarity of its prototype.  
Groups whose prototypes were clearer should have completed the task more quickly.  This 
measure of prototype clarity was used to test Hypotheses 3 and 4.  A positivity score was also 
calculated for each group by averaging the ratings for the 10 prototype descriptor words chosen 
by that group, with higher scores indicating more ingroup bias. (Hypothesis 4).   
Each person then wrote down all 10 words selected by the group, and was taken to a 
separate table.  Working independently, he or she was asked to rank the words by putting a “1” 
by the word that best described the group’s identity, a “2” by the next most descriptive word, and 
so on.  A rank order correlation was later computed between every possible pair of group 
members.  The average of the Fischer’s r to z transformed correlations within each group served 
as a measure of prototype agreement among group members.  This provided another way to test 
Hypotheses 3 and 4.   
After all group members finished their rankings, each person was given up to 20 minutes 
to complete a questionnaire (see Appendix B) that assessed the three components of categorical 
context described earlier.  The questions were designed to capture what each group member 
viewed as relevant comparative dimensions, the group’s positions on those dimensions, and the 
relevant outgroup(s) for comparative purposes.  Agreement among participants’ responses 
constituted another measure of prototype agreement (Hypothesis 3).  Because so many studies 
have shown a link between group identification and ingroup bias (e.g., see Brown, 2000), the 
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questionnaire also included Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone, & Crook’s (1989) nine-item scale 
of group identification.   
 After completing their questionnaires, group members were brought back to their original 
positions around the computer.  There they viewed a slide show of three posters made by other 
groups in the experiment, along with their own poster.  The comparison posters were chosen 
from a group of 11 posters created during pilot testing (comparison posters for the 11 pilot 
groups were created by the experimenter).  The choice of comparison posters was based on 
ratings made by four psychology graduate students.  These students, working independently, 
gave each poster ratings on four dimensions (creativity, artistic merit, clarity of message, and 
effectiveness) using scales that ranged from 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent).  Each judge also assigned 
an overall rating to each poster on the same scale.  Ratings on the four dimensions were meant to 
ensure that every judge’s overall ratings would be based on the same criteria.  The three posters 
in the middle of the distribution of overall ratings were chosen as comparison posters.   
Working independently, participants were asked to rate all four posters on the four 
dimensions just named, and then to give each poster an overall rating on a scale from 1 (poor) to 
10 (excellent).  Each person’s ratings (on the overall measure) of the three outgroup posters were 
averaged to form an outgroup score.  Ingroup and outgroup scores were then averaged across 
group members and the difference (ingroup – outgroup) between these numbers was computed 
as a group measure of ‘simple bias’, with higher scores indicating greater ingroup bias.   
At the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed and asked what they suspected 
the true purpose of the study was.  None suspected that it had anything to do with their 
discussion of other groups (most suspected that I was studying leadership or gender relations).  
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Participants were informed of the true purpose of the study and asked to provide an email contact 
so that they could be notified if their poster was selected as a prize-winner. 
The same graduate students who rated the pilot posters also rated each group’s own 
poster.  A measure of the four judges’ interrater reliability was calculated by computing an 
intraclass correlation among their ratings.  Their ratings were significantly correlated, r=0.58, 
p<.01.  The ratings were thus averaged and used as an independent measure of a poster’s “real” 
quality.  That number was then subtracted from the group’s rating of its own poster to create 
another measure of ingroup bias (‘aggrandizement’), with higher scores indicating greater bias.  
The simple bias and aggrandizement measures were used to test Hypothesis 4.   
The average of the judges’ ratings was also used as the basis for awarding the cash prizes 
for the top poster in each condition.  The members of the winning groups were notified and five 
of the six winners had checks mailed to them (the sixth failed to respond). 
Coding 
 Two coders (the experimenter and a person who was blind to both the experimental 
hypotheses and to the conditions from which the materials that she coded were drawn), evaluated 
the 40-minute segment of each video recording that showed the group working on its poster.  
The coders looked for evidence of talk describing comparative dimensions, making claims about 
the group’s position on those dimensions, and naming an outgroup or outgroups (see Appendix C 
for the full coding scheme).  Counts of statements reflecting these three dimensions of 
comparative context were used in testing Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.  
The blind coder was trained using video recordings of the pilot sessions.  After the 
different kinds of identity talk were explained to her, she and the experimenter separately 
evaluated five of the 10 recordings (one pilot group was dropped for failure to follow 
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instructions).  The coders discussed any differences in their counts, to refine their understanding 
of the coding scheme.  Then they recoded those five recordings and coded the remaining six 
recordings.  A measure of the coders’ reliability was calculated by computing a series of 
intraclass correlations involving their coding of the three main measures.  Outgroups [r=.98, 
p<.01], comparative dimensions [r=.87, p<.01], and the group’s position on those dimensions 
[r=.81, p<.01] showed significant correlations.  The blind coder then evaluated the remaining 
video recordings.   
A different coder, also blind to the hypotheses, was trained in the same coding system.  
She coded the 20-minute segments of groups in the Task-plus condition.  Recordings from the 
six groups in the pilot study that were in the Task-plus condition were used for the purposes of 
training and establishing reliability with the experimenter (Intraclass correlations for mentions of 
outgroups, comparative dimensions, and group positions were r=.88, r=.86, and r=.80 
respectively, p<.01.).  
The second coder also evaluated agreement among group members’ responses to the 
open-ended questions on the questionnaire.  These questions asked participants to list what it 
meant to be a member of the group (prototype agreement), how they were different from other 
people and other groups (comparative qualities), and what groups they would use as comparison 
targets for their group.  The coder rated all three group members’ responses to each question on a 
scale that ranged from 1 (high disagreement) to 5 (high agreement).  See Appendix D for the full 
coding scheme.   
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Results 
Response Interdependence 
 Most measures, including which prototype descriptors each group chose and how much 
time each group took to choose those descriptors, were collected at the group level, with group 
members making joint responses.  However, measures of group identification and ingroup bias 
were collected at the individual level.  It was therefore important to establish whether there was 
significant interdependence among the responses of individual group members before treating 
group averages as single data points.  Following Kenny and Judd (1986; see also Kenny, 
Mannetti, Pierro, Livi, and Kashy, 2002) a series of one-way ANOVAs was conducted using 
group membership as the independent variable and each individual’s scores or ratings as the 
dependent variables.  The mean squares from these ANOVAs were used to calculate an 
intraclass correlation for each measure.   
For the group identification scale, the intraclass correlation was significant, (r=.027, 
p<.05).  For the ingroup bias measures that involved participants ratings of their own and others 
posters, the intraclass correlations for the first comparison poster, r=.033, p<.05, the second 
comparison poster, r=.015, p<.05, and each groups’ own poster, r=.030, p<.05, were significant.  
The intraclass correlation for the third comparison poster, however, was not, r=-.003, p>.05.  
Because there was evidence of response interdependence on group identification and nearly all 
of the poster ratings, these scores were averaged and analyzed at a group level in every case. 
Hypothesis 1 
 The first hypothesis was that group members would propose a categorical context that 
included dimensions of comparison, the group’s positions on those dimensions, and a 
comparative outgroup or outgroups, all without intervention from the experimenter.  To test this, 
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a series of one sample t-tests (comparing the means with zero) was conducted using counts of 
how often outgroups, comparative dimensions, and a group’s position on those dimensions were 
mentioned.1   
Evidence for Hypothesis 1 was weak.  Groups in the Task-plus condition did mention 
outgroups in the 20-minute free-talk sessions [M=4.0, SD=2.76, t(20)=6.69, p<.01].  However, 
no groups mentioned comparative dimensions or their group’s position on those dimensions in 
that session.  Regardless of condition, groups also mentioned outgroups [M=3.68, SD=3.48, 
t(43)=7.01, p<.01] and comparative dimensions (M=.43, SD=1.24) during the 40-minute poster-
making sessions [t(43)=2.3, p<.05].  But group positions on these dimensions were rarely 
mentioned [M=1.66, SD=9.69, t(43)=1.35, p>.05].  Talk about one aspect of the categorical 
context did not seem to increase talk about another.  There were no significant correlations 
among any of these measures of categorical context in either the 20-minute, 40-minute, or total 
combined sessions.  
Hypothesis 2 
 Hypothesis 2 was that groups given time to talk without distraction would discuss their 
categorical context more extensively. Not surprisingly, the total number of times groups 
mentioned outgroups during the entire course of the experiment was significantly higher for 
groups in the Task-plus condition (M=7.86, SD=4.30) than in the Task-only condition (M=3.68, 
SD=3.99), t(41)=3.30, p<.01.  However, when comparing how often outgroups were mentioned 
divided by the total number of minutes available to a group for conversation (60 for groups in the 
Task-plus condition and 40 for groups in the Task-only condition), there was not a significant 
difference between the Task-plus (M=.13, SD=.07) and Task-only (M=.09, SD=.09) conditions 
[t(41)=1.46, p>.05], although the trend was in the predicted direction. 
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There was also no difference between the conditions in how often the groups discussed 
aspects of the comparative context during just the 40-minute poster making sessions.  Groups in 
the Task-plus condition (M=3.68, SD=2.98) did not mention outgroups more often than did 
groups in the Task-only condition (M=3.68, SD=3.99), t(42)=0, p>.05.  And there was no 
significant difference in the Task-plus (M=.59, SD=1.70) and the Task-only (M=.27, SD=.46) 
conditions in how often they mentioned comparative dimensions, t(42)=.84, p>.05.  Finally, the 
number of times groups mentioned their own position on a comparative dimension did not differ 
significantly between the Task-plus (M=2.90, SD=13.64) and Task-only (M=.41, SD=1.71) 
conditions, t(42)= .85, p>.05. 
Hypothesis 3 
 Hypothesis 3 was that more discussion of the categorical context would be positively 
correlated with greater prototype agreement.  As explained earlier, one measure of prototype 
agreement was created by averaging the Fisher r-to-z’ transformed correlations between each 
possible pair of group members (ranking agreement).  Across all groups, the average of these 
averaged z’ scores was .35 (SD=.33).  This was then converted back to a regular correlation, 
namely r=.34 (N=46), p<.05.  Prototype agreement was also measured by the total amount of 
time each group took to choose 10 prototype descriptor words (agreement time), with lower 
times indicating greater agreement.  The average time it took each group to complete this task 
was 204.59 seconds (SD=90.24).   
Other measures of prototype agreement were derived by coding participants’ responses to 
the three open-ended questions on the questionnaire.  These questions asked participants to list 
what it meant to be a member of the group (prototype agreement), how they were different from 
other people and other groups (comparative qualities), and what groups they would use as 
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comparison targets for their group.  Because the average ratings of agreement scores on these 
three questions were not significantly correlated (see Table 3), they were considered separately 
and an overall average was not computed.  A series of t-tests was conducted comparing the 
average agreement score on these three questionnaire measures with the neutral point (3.00) 
which was the code for no evidence of agreement or disagreement (see Appendix D for full 
coding scheme for these questions).  For prototype agreement, the average was 3.45 (SD=.69), 
t(44)=4.38, p<.01.  For comparative qualities, the average agreement score was 3.66 (SD=.78), 
t(44)=5.64, p<.01.  Agreement about choice of comparison targets, however, was not 
significantly different from the neutral midpoint [M=3.11, SD=.44, t(44)=1.70, p=.10]. 
There were some interesting correlations among the different measures of agreement.  
The time it took groups to choose prototype descriptor words was significantly correlated with 
the questionnaire measures of prototype agreement (r = -.33, p<.05) and comparative qualities  
(r = -.31, p<.05), such that groups that took less time to choose descriptor words (indicating 
greater prototype clarity) showed more agreement in their responses to what it meant to be a 
member of their group and more agreement about how their group was different from other 
people and/or groups.  And the prototype ranking agreement measure was significantly 
correlated with the questionnaire measures of comparative qualities agreement (r = +.35, p<.05) 
and comparison targets agreement (r =+.37, p<.05).  This means that groups that had higher 
agreement in ranking the importance of their group’s chosen descriptor words also had higher 
agreement in their response to the question about how they were different from other people 
and/or groups and higher agreement about what groups they would use as comparison targets for 
their group.  See Table 3 for these correlations.  
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Contrary to the hypothesis, however, discussion of the categorical context was not related 
to prototype agreement. Mentions of outgroups, comparative dimensions, and the group’s 
position on those dimensions were not significantly correlated with any measure of agreement or 
prototype clarity for either the 20- or 40-minute sessions. 
Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 focused on ingroup bias.  As described earlier, two measures of in-group 
bias were calculated, simple bias and aggrandizement.  These measures were significantly 
correlated (r= +.50, p<.01).  One-sample t-tests were conducted, comparing each measure 
against a value of zero, to test whether there was evidence of in-group bias in the poster ratings. 
Such evidence was found for both simple bias [M=1.24, SD=1.36, t(43)=6.04, p<.01] and 
aggrandizement [M=1.88, SD=1.20, t(43)=10.33. p<.01].  Another possible measure of ingroup 
bias is the average positivity of the prototype descriptor words chosen by each group.  Group 
positivity scores ranged from 3.48 to 4.80 with a mean of 4.43 (SD=.29).  A one-sample t-test 
showed that this mean was significantly greater than the average positivity score (2.89) of the 
words from which participants could choose, t(43)=35.52, p<.01.  However, this measure was 
not significantly correlated with any of the other measures of ingroup bias. 
Given this evidence for ingroup bias, the next step was to look at possible predictors.  
Research in the social identity/self-categorization context has most often looked at group 
identification as a predictor of ingroup bias (see Brown, 2000; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 
2002).  The average of group members’ scores on Hinkle et al.’s (1989) scale of group 
identification was computed to provide a group measure of ingroup identification.   Group 
members tended to identify strongly with their groups, with a mean identification score of 7.03 
(SD =.82) out of a possible high score of 9.  Group identification was significantly positively 
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correlated with two measures of bias, namely aggrandizement (r=.42, p<.01) and 
positivity(r=.49, p<.01).   It was not, however, significantly correlated with simple bias. 
Group identification was also significantly and positively correlated with both 
comparative qualities agreement (r=.43, p<.01) and outgroup agreement (r=.33, p<.05), 
although not with any measures of agreement about the group’s prototype itself (prototype 
ranking agreement, time taken to choose prototype words, or questionnaire prototype 
agreement).  There was also no a significant difference between Task-plus (M=7.22, SD=.65) 
and Task-only (M=6.84, SD=.94) conditions on the identification measure [t(42)= 1.56, p=.13]. 
As predicted in Hypothesis 4, there were significant positive correlations between 
aggrandizement and a group’s agreement about what made them different from other groups 
(r=.30, p<.05) and also its agreement about comparison targets (r=.34, p<.05).  There were not, 
however, significant correlations between any of the prototype agreement measures (prototype 
ranking agreement, time taken to choose prototype words, or questionnaire prototype agreement) 
and any of the bias measures.  See Tables 3 and 4 for all of correlations involving bias and group 
identification.  
There were also no significant differences in simple bias scores between the Task-plus 
(M=1.54, SD=1.55) and Task-only (M=.94, SD=1.1) conditions, t(42)= 1.46, p=.15, although the 
trend was in the hypothesized direction.  There was also no significant difference between the 
Task-plus (M=2.16, SD=1.35) and Task-only (M=1.59, SD=1.1) conditions in aggrandizement 
scores, t(42)= 1.60, p=.12, although the difference was again in the hypothesized direction.    
Group positivity scores also did not differ significantly between the Task-plus (M=4.43, SD=.28) 
and the Task-only (M=4.44, SD=.31) conditions, t(42)=-.13, p>.05. 
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Discussion 
 As predicted in Hypothesis 1, most groups did spontaneously mention outgroups in their 
conversations, during both the 40-minute and the 20-minute sessions.  For example, over 75% of 
the groups either implicitly or explicitly mentioned the existence of the other groups 
participating in the experiment.  They did not, however, discuss the full categorical context, 
including comparative dimensions and their own group’s stance on those dimensions.  Although 
Reicher and Hopkins (1996) emphasized the importance of all three of these elements, it is 
possible that the constraints of the experimental situation made such discussion unnecessary.  It 
is possible that the comparative dimension and the group’s position on that dimension (skill at 
poster-design, with the belief that the ingroup was better in that regard) were implied by the 
situation.  The nature of the experiment, including the fact that the group was told that it was 
competing against other groups for cash prizes, may have made more than a brief mention of 
these outgroups by group members unnecessary.  The experimenter’s acknowledgement of their 
existence could have made these outgroups highly accessible and may have been all that was 
needed to establish the relevant outgroup, comparative dimension, and the groups’ position on 
that dimension without extensive discussion by the group.   
There are other factors that could make a particular categorical context accessible to 
group members without the need for discussion.  For example, Oakes (1987) discusses the idea 
of ‘chronic accessibility’ - for some individuals, certain ingroup/outgroup characterizations are 
so familiar that they are always highly accessible and likely to be used.  If several people with 
the same ‘chronically accessible’ categorizations came together, then they might automatically 
agree on a categorical context without the need for discussion or any other cues.  Alternatively, 
situational salience could activate the same categorical context for group members.  Because the 
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accessibility of a category depends on the current goals and objectives of the perceiver (Oakes, 
1987), group members who are given the same goal may all focus on the same categorical 
context. 
 Hypothesis 2 had some support, in that groups given more time to talk did indeed 
mention the comparative context more often than did groups given less time to talk.  However, 
the fact that any particular type of talk occurred more in groups that had more overall time to talk 
does not seem surprising.  When discussion of categorical context was divided by how many 
minutes each group had for discussion, there was no difference between conditions.  There was 
also no difference between conditions in the number of times that groups discussed their 
categorical context in just the 40-minute sessions.  This suggests that the rate of discussion of 
outgroups was not necessarily affected by whether or not the group was actively engaged in the 
task, although the trends were in the predicted directions.   
 Hypothesis 3, that more discussion of the categorical context would be positively 
correlated with greater prototype agreement, was also not supported.  There were no significant 
correlations between the amount of discussion of categorical context and any measure of 
prototype agreement.  Again, it is possible that the experimental conditions made a relevant 
comparative outgroup and categorical context obvious to participants so that a strong group 
prototype could be developed without discussing the categorical context.   
It is also possible that more discussion of the categorical context does lead to greater 
agreement about that context among group members, but that this agreement does not lead to 
greater agreement about the ingroup’s prototype.  This is not likely, however, given evidence 
that when a categorical context is stipulated (thus creating agreement), there is more agreement 
about the ingroup prototype (e.g. Haslam et al., 1995; Hopkins & Murdoch, 1998; Voci, 2006).   
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Hypothesis 4, that greater prototype agreement would be positively correlated with 
ingroup/outgroup biases, was not supported.  As many researchers have found (see Hewstone, 
Rubin, & Willis, 2002 for review), ingroup bias is common, and I found clear evidence of it as 
well.  The strength of that bias, however, was not correlated with discussion of the categorical 
context or prototype agreement.   However, groups that displayed greater agreement about who 
their target outgroups were, or about what made their group different from other people and 
groups, did have higher aggrandizement scores.  So, agreement about these two facets of the 
comparative context does seem to be related to increased bias. 
 Hypothesis 4 was based on the notion that a clear prototype is required for ingroup 
identification, which is the basis for ingroup bias.  But further reflection suggests that it may 
have been possible for each group member to have a strong, clear prototype without much 
agreement among group members about what that prototype was.  Even if each person had a 
different idea about what it meant to be a group member, they might still have identified with the 
group and displayed ingroup bias.  In fact, group identification as measured by the questionnaire 
was significantly correlated with bias (aggrandizement and positivity) and with agreement about 
comparison groups.  Ingroup bias is often stronger in the presence of a highly accessible 
outgroup (e.g. Voci, 2006), and more agreement among group members about comparison 
groups and about qualities that set members of their group apart may indicate a more accessible 
outgroup, with or without discussion about who that outgroup is.   
 Although Voci (2006) found that ingroup bias was stronger when an outgroup was made 
highly accessible, metacontrast may be only one of several processes that can lead to increased 
ingroup bias.  Gaertner et al. (2006) have shown that in laboratory groups, intragroup processes 
(e.g. awareness of common fate, attraction, cooperation, interaction, and increased entitativity) 
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can lead to higher levels of ingroup regard even when there is no explicit outgroup for 
comparison.  Although it could be argued that laboratory experiments have inescapable 
comparison outgroups, the researchers took pains to rule out the explanation that group members 
were thinking about other groups.   
Gaertner et al.’s (2006) findings suggest that proponents of social identity and self-
categorization theories may be too strong in their statements that groups only “exist” when there 
are outgroups (e.g. Hogg, 2001; Turner et al., 1987).  It is possible that the ingroup biases in my 
experiment were not correlated with the amount of talk about the comparative context because 
they were based on the same kinds of intragroup processes described by Gaertner et al., not 
intergroup processes.   Future researchers will need to do more detailed analyses of both of these 
types of processes to determine how groups come to define themselves. 
Although this experiment was a good first step in understanding the relationship between 
talk, categorical context, and prototype strength during group formation, it did have several 
limitations.  One problem was the test of whether greater agreement among group members 
about the three components of categorical context is actually correlated with greater prototype 
agreement.  This is assumed by self-categorization theory and the principle of meta-contrast, but 
it has not been explicitly tested in previous research.  Although I measured group members’ 
agreement about comparative targets and the qualities that made them different from other 
groups, these measures probably did not fully capture categorical context.  The questions used 
for these measures (e.g. “What specific kinds of people or groups would you compare your 
group to?”) may have been unclear.  Indeed, several participants expressed confusion during 
debriefing about what was expected of them (e.g. asking if I meant who the group was similar to 
or who the group was different than) in answering the open-ended questions, although these 
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concerns did not appear during pilot testing.  Development of a valid and reliable measure of 
agreement about the categorical context, separate from discussion about it, is needed.  
The other main limitation was the constrained nature of the participants’ interactions.  I 
had hoped that each group would discuss a variety of possible outgroups and that the resulting 
group prototypes would partially depend on how much agreement there was about those 
outgroups.  As discussed earlier, however, giving each group a specific goal (to create a poster) 
and explicitly telling it about the existence of other groups, may have inadvertently made the 
entire categorical context as obvious as it has been in previous studies.   
 Maybe this shortcoming is inherent to laboratory research.  By virtue of the voluntary 
sign-up system, participants know that there will be other groups in the same experiment 
(relevant outgroups).  They also have expectations that the experimenter will tell them what to do 
and that these other groups will be doing the same or similar things (dimensions of comparison).  
If the task is performance-based, then the group’s stance on these dimensions of comparison will 
probably be that it is more competent at the task than are other groups.  It may be possible to 
have a group decide its own position or stance on dimensions of comparison in a laboratory 
setting by having an opinion-based task, but the other components of the categorical context are 
difficult to leave open. 
One way to address this issue might be to conduct a series of field studies specifically 
looking at the same hypotheses.  Studying real-world groups would make it possible to examine 
these hypotheses in an environment where the categorical context is not stipulated directly or 
indirectly by the experimenter.  Although many types of groups could be studied, on-line virtual 
groups might be a good choice.  This would ensure the capture of most of the communications 
amongst group members, eliminate the need for transcription, and remove communication 
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through non-verbal cues.  Although there are differences between virtual groups and face-to-face 
groups, virtual groups and group members tend to engage in similar types of identity behaviors 
(see McKenna & Green, 2002).   
A first step in such research would be to establish whether these groups do in fact talk 
about the categorical context while establishing their group identity.  The coding scheme 
developed for the current study could be used to address this question.  Coders would examine 
transcripts of the first few days of communication among group members, looking for evidence 
of any discussion about the categorical context. 
Testing whether or not more discussion of this context is related to greater agreement 
about the group’s prototype or with greater incidence of various behaviors related to group 
identity could be done by questionnaire.  Each member of the group would be asked to respond 
to questions about what he or she believes to be the most relevant outgroup, what dimensions are 
important in comparing the two groups, and what each group’s position is on those dimensions.  
The questionnaire would also include items assessing each member’s ideas about the group’s 
prototype, his or her identification with the group, and a measure of ingroup bias.  Analyses 
would be similar to those conducted here.   
If the results of this or similar studies support the hypotheses, then the next step would be 
to return to the laboratory under more controlled conditions to explore related questions.  One 
important manipulation might be to encourage newly formed groups to explicitly discuss the 
categorical context.  Would such encouragement actually lead to more talk about the categorical 
context?  If so, then would the increase be enough to produce greater agreement among group 
members about that context?  Would that, in turn, lead to greater agreement about the group 
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prototype?  And would greater agreement about the prototype lead to greater identification with 
the group and/or an increase in ingroup bias?   
Such a return to the laboratory, however, brings us back to the problem of inadvertently 
stipulating to the groups that the relevant outgroups are the other groups in the experiment, that 
performance on the task is the comparative dimension, and that the only stance they need to 
worry about is that they are more competent at the task than the other groups.  This problem 
could be ameliorated by accepting that groups will compare themselves to other groups in the 
experiment and manipulating the task so that they need to choose which other group(s) will be 
their comparison targets.  This could be done by presenting a more open-ended task, such as 
preparing a grant proposal.  Groups could be asked to make a case for funds from a limited 
monetary pool to be given to the group’s choice of any charity, research, school improvement 
fund, etc.  To shift the focus from “those other groups” to specific groups as relevant outgroups, 
materials about fictitious “groups” and their proposals could be “accidentally” left in 
conspicuous places.  The open-ended nature of the task, combined with information about 
several possible comparison groups, might be enough to increase the variability in the amount 
and kinds of talk that occurs, perhaps enough to see patterns and relationships.   
Given the importance of social identity and self-categorization theory to the field of 
social psychology, it is important to continue to explore the categorical context and how groups 
come to know what that context is.  But if Gaertner et al. (2006) are correct in their assertion that 
the principle of metacontrast is not crucial to group processes, it may be even more important to 
the field to continue this line of research.  If future research demonstrates, as mine did, that 
groups do not discuss categorical context or agree about categorical context, but still have strong 
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group identification and behaviors, this could lend support to the challengers of self-
categorization theory.   
This research has been useful in several ways.  Although I believe the laboratory setting 
may have hampered the natural social process of group identity formation, the attempt to 
examine these processes in an in-depth fashion suggests several future lines of study that 
combine traditional social cognition theories with the methodologies of sociology and small 
groups researchers.  My development and implementation of a coding system for quantifying this 
type of talk could also aid future research in this area.  Most importantly, it has been a first step 
in understanding the social, interactive processes that are important in group identity formation 
and in developing ideas about the importance of outgroups in identity formation and identity 
talk.   
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 Notes 
1 Each of these measures was significantly positively skewed.  Following Kirk (1968), a 
logarithmic transformation was conducted.  However, the data were still significantly skewed 
even after the transformation.  Given Kirk’s assertion that F and t- tests are relatively robust even 
with skewed data, the original, non-transformed counts were used for analysis.  
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Table 1. 
Means and Standard Deviations by Condition 
  Task-Plus Task-Only Total
Variable M SD M SD M SD
-20 min. – Mention Outgroups 4 2.76 NA NA 4 2.76 
-20 min. – Comparative 
Dimensions 
0 0 NA NA 0 0 
-20 min. – Mention Group 
Position 
.048 .22 NA NA .048 .22 
-40 min. – Mention Outgroups 3.68 2.99 3.68 3.99 3.68 3.48 
-40 min. – Comparative 
Dimensions 
.59 1.71 .27 .46 .43 1.25 
-40 min. – Mention Group 
Position 
2.91 13.64 .41 1.70 1.66 9.69 
-Total – Mention Outgroups 7.86 4.30 3.68 3.99 5.72 4.61 
-Total – Mention Comparative 
Dimensions 
.62 1.75 .27 .46 .44 1.26 
-Total  – Mention Group 
Position 
3.10 14.18 .41 1.71 1.72 9.96 
-Prototype Choice Time (in 
sec.) 
179.77 75.79 229.41 98.64 204.59 90.24 
-Prototype Ranking Agreement .37 .38 .33 .28 .35 .33 
-Prototype Agreement – 
Questionnaire 
3.5 .58 3.4 .80 3.45 .69 
-Comparative Qualities 
Agreement – Questionnaire 
3.73 .77 3.59 .80 3.66 .78 
-Comparative Target 
Agreement – Questionnaire 
3.05 .38 3.18 .50 3.11 .44 
-Simple Bias 1.53 1.55 .94 1.10 1.24 1.36 
-Aggrandizement 2.16 1.35 1.59 .98 1.87 1.20 
-Positivity 4.43 .28 4.44 .31 4.43 .29 
-Group Identification 7.22 .65 6.8 .94 7.03 .82 
 
34 
Table 2 
 
Correlation Among Categorical Context and Prototype Measures 
 a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. 
a.  20 min. - Mention Outgroups _   
b.  20 min. - Mention Group Position .166 _   
c.  40 min. - Mention Outgroups .142 .245 _   
d.  40 min. - Mention Comparative 
Dimensions -.104 .050 -.075 _   
e.  40 min. - Mention Group Position .166 1.00** .164 .080 _   
f.   Prototype Choice Time -.140 -.046 .070 -.206 -.065 _  
g.   Prototype Ranking Agreement -.305 -.091 .221 .190 -.060 .168 _ 
h.   Prototype Agreement - Questionnaire -.038 .034 -.021 .105 .025 -.328* .224 _
i.   Comparative Qualities Agreement -   
Questionnaire -.046 .084 -.170 .252 .077
-
.312* .347* .210 _
j.   Comparative Target Agreement - 
Questionnaire -.189 -.028 .024 -.091 -.045 -.047 .367* .132 .251 _
 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
   “20 min. – Mention Comparative Dimension” not included because variable was constant (0) 
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Table 3 
 
Correlation Among Prototype, Bias, and Identification Measures 
 f. g. h. i. j. k. l. m. n. 
f.  Prototype Choice Time _  
g.  Prototype Ranking Agreement .168 _  
h.  Prototype Agreement - 
Questionnaire -.328* .224 _  
i.  Comparative Qualities 
Agreement - Questionnaire -.312* .347* .210 _  
j.  Comparative Target Agreement 
- Questionnaire -.047 .367* .132 .251 _  
k.  Simple Bias -.138 .125 .132 .190 .174 _ 
l.  Aggrandizement -.132 .145 .136 .298* .339* .498** _
m.  Positivity -.277 .183 .291 .243 .194 -.258 .112 _
n.  Group Identification -.174 .190 .138 .429** .333* .180 .415** .485** _
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 4 
 
Correlation Among Categorical Context, Bias, and Identification Measures 
 a. b. c. d. e. k. l. m. n. 
a. 20 min. - Mention Outgroups _   
b. 20 min. - Mention Group Position .166 _   
c. 40 min. - Mention Outgroups .142 .245 _   
d. 40 min. - Mention Comparative 
Dimensions -.104 .050 -.075 _   
e. 40 min. - Mention Group Position .166 1.00** .164 .080 _   
k. Simple Bias .056 .602** -.080 -.001 .487** _  
l. Aggrandizement .147 .231 -.079 -.030 .197 .498** _ 
m. Positivity -.165 -.483* -.014 -.131 -.331* -.258 .112 _
n. Group Identification .027 -.181 -.227 -.007 -.085 .180 .415** .485** _
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix A 
Meaningful trait adjectives 
Absent-minded 
Aggressive 
Alert 
Ambitious 
Amusing 
Angry 
Argumentative 
Attentive 
Bashful 
Boastful 
Bold 
Boring 
Broad-minded 
Calm 
Capable 
Careful 
Careless 
Cautious 
Cheerful 
Clever 
Clumsy 
Cold 
Competent 
Complaining 
Conceited 
Confident 
Conformist 
Considerate 
Cooperative 
Courteous 
Cowardly 
Creative 
Critical 
Cruel 
Curious 
Daring 
Daydreamer 
Dependable 
Dependent 
Depressed 
Disagreeable 
Discourteous 
Dishonest 
Disobedient 
Distrustful 
Dominating 
Domineering 
Easygoing 
Efficient 
Egotistical 
Emotional 
Energetic 
Enthusiastic 
Envious 
Excitable 
Excited 
Fault-finding 
Fearful 
Forgetful 
Forgiving 
Frank 
Friendly 
Generous 
Gloomy 
Gossipy 
Greedy 
Gullible 
Happy 
Helpful 
Honest 
Hostile 
Hot-tempered 
Humorous 
Idealistic 
Ill-mannered 
Imaginative 
Impolite 
Impractical 
Impulsive 
Inconsistent 
Indecisive 
Independent 
Indifferent 
Inquisitive 
Insecure 
Insincere 
Intelligent 
Irresponsible 
Irritable 
Irritating 
Jealous 
Kind 
Lazy 
Liar 
Logical 
Lonely 
Lonesome 
Loud-mouthed 
Loyal 
Malicious 
Materialistic 
Mean 
Modest 
Moody 
Narrow-minded 
Neat 
Nervous 
Noisy 
Nonconforming 
Nosy 
Obedient 
Obnoxious 
Observant 
Orderly 
Outgoing 
Overconfident 
Overcritical 
Oversensitive 
Patient 
Perfectionistic 
Persistent 
Persuasive 
Pessimistic 
Phony 
Pleasant 
Polite 
Possessive 
Practical 
Prejudiced 
Prompt 
Proud 
Punctual 
Quarrelsome 
Quiet 
Rebellious 
Relaxed 
Reliable 
Responsible 
Restless 
Rude 
Sarcastic 
Self-assured 
Self-centered 
Self-confident 
Self-conscious 
Self-critical 
Selfish 
Self-reliant 
Sensible 
Sentimental 
Serious 
Short-tempered 
Shy 
Silent 
Sincere 
Sloppy 
Sociable 
Stubborn 
Studious 
Superstitious 
Systematic 
Talented 
Talkative 
Thoughtful 
Thrifty 
Tidy 
Timid 
Tolerant 
Trustful 
Trustworthy 
Truthful 
Unappreciative 
Unattentive 
Unconventional 
Understanding 
Unemotional 
Unfriendly 
Ungrateful 
Unhappy 
Unhealthy 
Unimaginative 
Unintelligent 
Uninteresting 
Unkind 
Unobservant 
Unpleasant 
Unpredictable 
Unpunctual 
Unreliable 
Unselfish 
Unsociable 
Unsympathetic 
Untidy 
Untrustworthy 
Untruthful 
Warm 
Wasteful 
Well-mannered 
Witty 
Worrier 
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Appendix B 
Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions.  Please do not discuss your responses with any of 
the other members of your group.  Your responses will be completely confidential. 
 
1. Gender    M  F 
2. Age:   ________ 
 3.  Native English Speaker?  Yes No 
4.  Race or Ethnicity: ___________________ 
 5. Undergraduate Major:  ___________________ 
 
Please answer the following questions about the group you worked with today: 
6. Aside from the adjectives your group chose from the list today, how would you 
describe what it means to be a member of your group? 
 
 
 
 
 
7. In what ways is your group different from other people or other groups?  
 a. 
 b. 
 c. 
 d. 
 e. 
39 
 f. 
 g. 
8. What specific kinds of people or groups would you compare your group to? 
 a. 
 b. 
 c. 
 d. 
 e.  
 f. 
 g. 
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Please circle the number that best describes your reactions to the following statements. 
15. I identify with this group 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9    
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
 
16. I am glad to belong to this group. 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9    
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
 
17. I feel held back by this group. 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9    
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
 
18. I think this group worked well together. 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9    
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
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19. I see myself as an important part of this group. 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9    
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
 
20. I do not fit in well with the other members of this group. 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9    
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
 
21. I do not consider the group to be important. 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9    
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
 
22. I feel uneasy with the members of this group. 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9    
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
 
23. I feel strong ties to this group. 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9    
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
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Appendix C 
Videotape Coding Scheme 
Codes and descriptions 
1 - Outsiders 
1a - Experimenter (any mention of the experimenter) 
1b - Explicitly mention other groups in the experiment ('I wonder how many other groups they are'; 
We're better than all the other groups') 
1c - Implicitly mention other groups in experiment ('Let's win the $10.00') 
1d - Other individuals  
1e - Outside concrete groups (cheerleading squad, sorority, psych class, etc.) (does not include 
groups that one or more group members belong to) 
1f - Outside social categories (gender, age, race, fat people, drunks, etc.) (does not include groups 
that one or more group members belong to) 
1g - new group? (put an x in this box if this is a group or individual that has not been mentioned 
before) 
2 - Affiliations 
2a - other group membership (mention of concrete groups that one or more group members belong to 
with the exception of the lab group - fraternities, religions, book clubs, etc.) 
2b - social classes (mention of social class that  one or more group members belong to - race, gender, 
age, etc.) 
2c - new affiliation? (put an x in this box if this is a group affiliation that has not been mentioned 
before) 
3 - Comparative Dimensions 
3a - Implied dimension ('we're the best' (at what?); 'we're not as good'; etc. - must be a comparison -
'we're better' - yes, 'we're good' - no) 
3b - explicit dimension ('we're the worst at making this poster'; 'my teacher draws well'; 'they drink a 
lot'; 'we're smarter') 
4 - Stance (where the group or individual stands on a particular comparative dimension - 'we're 
smarter'; 'we're less creative'; 'I drink less than she does') 
4a - group stance (we/us or general agreement) 
4b - individual stance (I/me or lack of general agreement) 
5 -  Descriptions of group (we're good, we're funny, we're smart, etc. - NOT comparisons (we're better 
than, we're funnier, we're smartest) 
6 - Individual Self Statements (I am…, I like…., I believe, I'm from Chicago, I'm good at...) (Not about 
task - I think we should ….) 
7 - Me too (acknowledgement that group member shares a personal characteristic - I'm from Chicago 
too, I'm also in that psych class) 
8 - Not me (saying that another person's individual self statement does not apply to self - "I'm from 
Rhode Island" (immediately following a statement of I'm from Chicago - this would count both as a self 
statement and as a 'not me') 
9 - Asking for self info (where are you from?; Are you a Capricorn too?; Don't you just love 
Chocolate?) 
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Appendix D 
Questionnaire Coding  
1 – Strong Disagreement – no two group members show evidence of agreement and at 
least two group members contradict one another (e.g., A – “We’re all very lazy”, B – 
“We’re hard workers”, C – “Everyone was friendly”) or there is disagreement on two 
or more qualities, even if there is agreement on other qualities or between two group 
members. 
2 – Disagreement – at least two group members contradict one another on one quality, 
but there is agreement between group members on another quality or between two 
other group members on the same quality (e.g., A – “we’re smarter, we’ve never met 
before, we don’t talk much”, B – “we talk a lot, we’re really smart, we are all girls”, C 
– “we have no history together, we all hate this experiment”). 
3 – Neutrality – No evidence of agreement or disagreement (i.e. all three group members 
talked about unrelated qualities or groups). 
4 – Agreement – Two group members indicate agreement on at least one quality or 
dimension and there is no evidence of disagreement (e.g., A - “We’re harder working 
than other groups, we love psychology”, B – “we all worked really hard”, C – “We 
talk a lot, we are good artists”). 
5 – Strong Agreement – There is no evidence of disagreement and all three group 
members show evidence of agreement on one dimension or there is evidence of 
agreement between two group members on two or more dimensions.  
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